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REAL DIFFERENCES AND STEREOTYPES—TWO
VISIONS OF GENDER, CITIZENSHIP,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
M. Isabel Medina*




Caesar kisses every day.
Genevieve does not know that it is only in this country that she
could speak as she does.
She does speak very well doesn’t she. She told them that there
was not the slightest intention on the part of her countrymen to
eat the fish that was not caught in their country.
In this she was mistaken.1
Primary resistance to globalization today has been directed at
economic and market forces, but it also has found voice in claims
that globalization imposes Western or American cultural, legal,
and political values on other cultures. Resistance to globalization,
whether through terrorist violence like that directed at the World
Trade Center in 2001, or through increasingly oppressive immigra-
tion and detention policies directed against noncitizens,2 is un-
likely to prevent the continuing development of a global order.
The United States has a strong interest in facilitating that develop-
ment and ensuring that a global order incorporates a strong com-
mitment to human rights. Because it is a powerful country—at
times too much a Caesar—American efforts to shape globalization
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1 Gertrude Stein, Ladies’ Voices, Act 3, in SELECTED OPERAS AND PLAYS OF GERTRUDE
STEIN 3, 4 (John Malcolm Brinnin, ed., 1970).
2 See, e.g., MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS (2004);
see also American Bar Association, Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants,
Report to the House of Delegates, Feb. 10, 2003.
315
316 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:315
are likely to be accompanied by claims that the United States
merely seeks to impose its own values on the world community.  It
is difficult to distinguish between policies and practices that “im-
pose” values on unwilling cultures, and policies and practices that
foster communication, consensus, and adherence to particular val-
ues.  However, characterizing efforts to develop communication
and consensus on national and global adherence to human rights
norms as “imposition” of values, serves only to frustrate communi-
cation and change.
One value commonly perceived to be at variance between
Western and other cultures is gender equality. The extent to which
adherence to gender equality represents a variance between cul-
tures is best acknowledged so that emergence of an international
world order is accompanied by adequate safeguards to ensure com-
pliance at national and global levels with norms of gender equality.
One method of promoting and facilitating greater understanding
and consensus on gender equality as part of an international legal
world order is continual consideration of international legal norms
in constitutional adjudication. The United States may be less like
Caesar if in developing national constitutional norms it considers
issues that have global dimensions within a global context.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is one jurist willing to pursue this
approach. It is, of course, appropriate to consider Justice Gins-
burg’s decisions in the context of gender equality, for her legacy is
well known and well regarded.3 For some years now, Justice Gins-
burg’s work has illustrated an awareness that our place in the
global order requires consideration of international norms and
practice in the formulation of our own national norms.4 Future dis-
cussions of how globalization should or may be shaped must in-
clude a guarantee of gender equality that transcends national,
religious, and cultural borders. Acknowledging our own missteps
in accepting gender equality as a norm, and placing our legal de-
velopments in the global context may help build consensus and
acceptance of gender equality throughout the world community. I
explore three ideas in this article.
First, the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in citizen-
ship cases fail to articulate a clear and coherent concept of citizen-
3 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451
(1978).
4 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Fifty-First Cardozo Memorial
Lecture Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
253 (1999).
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ship and how citizenship has been informed by gender.5 Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Miller v. Albright is an exception.6
Miller involved a claim by the nonmarital daughter of a U.S. citizen
father that the statute that denied her citizenship was unconstitu-
tional because it treated nonmarital children of U.S. citizen fathers
differently from nonmarital children of U.S. citizen mothers.7 Five
justices affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the nonmarital
child’s claim but no majority opinion emerged.8 Justice Ginsburg
dissented, along with Justices Breyer and Souter.9 Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion detailed the extent of gender discrimination in
prior U.S. citizenship statutes and the efforts of the more modern
Congress to eliminate gender bias from citizenship and naturaliza-
tion statutes.10 But Justice Ginsburg’s Miller dissent is atypical of
majority decisions in citizenship and immigration cases.
In the view of the Court, citizenship, in the context of gender,
means little for the individual; it secures no rights or responsibili-
ties, including the right to vote or to reside in one’s country with
one’s spouse.11  Paradoxically, in other contexts, such as deporta-
5 Scholarship on citizenship has flourished in the past few decades. See, e.g., CITI-
ZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES (T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Douglas Klusmeyer, eds., 2001); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS
OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997). The dialogue on citizenship extends not just
to questions of membership, but, of course, to questions of equality. See Kenneth L.
Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977); see also, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Dis-
crimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197
(1994).
In this article, I do not attempt to provide a substantive and comprehensive defi-
nition or concept of citizenship. Nor do I explore the question of membership and
the extent to which citizenship should matter in the law. For a discussion of human
rights and constitutional protections, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CON-
STITUTION (1996).
6 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-68 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
7 Miller, 523 U.S. at 429.
8 Justices Stevens and Rehnquist reached the merits of the case and found no
Equal Protection violation. Miller, 523 U.S. at 423-45. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
reasoned that the daughter lacked standing to assert her U.S. citizen father’s claims
and, thus, did not consider the merits of the Equal Protection claim. Miller, 523 U.S.
at 445-52 (O’Connor, J., concurring on the judgment). Justice Scalia believed that
citizenship determinations are plenary with Congress, thus, the Court has no power to
confer citizenship “on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress.” Miller, 523 U.S.
at 452-59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
9 Miller, 523 U.S. at 460-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 523 U.S. at 471-85 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
10 Miller, 523 U.S. at 460-68.
11 See U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Chang Chan v. Nagle,
268 U.S. 346 (1925); see also Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915); Low Wah Suey v.
Backus, 255 U.S. 460 (1912) (wife of Chinese-born U.S. citizen could be deported with
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tion or detention, citizenship may mean everything, including the
right to live in the country where one has been raised, and the
right to be close to the only family one has known.12
In describing the interplay between the Supreme Court’s de-
velopment of a constitutional norm on gender and citizenship, I
explore cases involving acquisition or loss of citizenship, the con-
text in which the Court has most often developed constitutional
norms of citizenship.13 The Court’s concept of citizenship, how-
ever, is informed by other factual contexts. Some of those contexts
are helpful in coming to an understanding of the Court’s vision of
citizenship and gender. Thus, I consider cases in which the Court
has decided a claim of sex discrimination, whether implicitly or
explicitly, and in which some aspect of citizenship is discussed or is
material to the resolution of the case.14 I include cases that deal
with gender and with activities that are viewed today as activities
available only to citizens, like voting and the ability to reside in
one’s country, which is another way to describe freedom from
deportation.
Second, I explore the idea that American adherence to norms
of gender equality is inconsistent and remains in flux. This theme
is developed by examining Supreme Court decisions on gender dis-
crimination in the context of citizenship. These decisions reflect
the tensions and discordant views of gender equality that continue
to dominate global and national views about gender and the
proper role of women and men in transmitting or constructing citi-
zenship in national or transnational societies. Notwithstanding a
well developed legal structure to combat gender discrimination in
minimal process on the grounds that she had been found in a house of prostitution);
Yeung How v. North, 223 U.S. 705 (1912).
12 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001);
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); see also U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
13 Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53; Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971); Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at
299. Other cases deal directly with acquisition or loss of citizenship. See, e.g., Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (holding that Congress lacks power to involuntarily divest a
person of her or his United States citizenship); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964)
(holding that a statute providing that a naturalized citizen loses her or his citizenship
after continuous residence for three years in her or his country of origin violates the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (holding
that a child born in the United States of alien parents is a U.S. citizen and is not
subject to deportation because her parents had taken her from the United States to
Sweden as a child where she resided until reaching the age of majority); Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. at 649 (holding that the detention of and exclusion from the United
States of an adult born in United States of Chinese parents is unwarranted because he
is a citizen of the United States).
14 See U. S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
162 (1874).
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the United States, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reflects an
inconsistent and tenuous adherence to gender equality as a consti-
tutionally enforceable norm.
This article explores the Court’s modern vision of gender and
citizenship through two cases, United States v. Virginia15 (VMI), au-
thored by Justice Ginsburg, and Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service,16 the case in which a majority of the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute challenged in Miller.17  These cases
make clear that in the context of American society, stereotypes
about sexual behavior, maternity, paternity, and parenting, in turn
influenced by stereotypes about class, race, and ethnicity, remain
primary stumbling blocks to substantive gender equality as well as
to a comprehensive and consistent view of citizenship.
Third, globalization is defined as the emergence and contin-
ued development of an international world order. Globalization in
one sense is a tautology. It merely describes the interrelatedness
and interdependence of the earth and its organisms. Formal recog-
nition, whether voluntary or involuntary, of this interdependence
is inevitable. Globalization, however, does not eliminate difference.
Differences are an inherent aspect of humanity. Differences are an
inherent part of the American legal system and of American soci-
ety, which has, since its founding, perceived itself at least in part as
a heterogeneous society. At least two constitutional principles sup-
port the view that America, since its founding, is a heterogeneous
society: the First Amendment, which implicitly acknowledges diver-
sity of thought, speech and religion;18 and federalism, which im-
plicitly recognizes variance among states and local communities.19
Tolerance for difference, necessary for a heterogeneous society to
thrive, cannot allow differences to subvert basic human rights. Slav-
ery serves as an example of the extent to which tolerance may ac-
commodate differences. Such oppression is inconsistent with a free
and just society.
Globalization poses potent challenges to strong and continued
adherence to norms of gender equality.20 A substantial number of
15 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
16 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
17 Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
20 VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1136-38
(1999).  Some authors question the usefulness of culture as a prism through which to
view or judge gender bias. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1181 (2001); Leti Volpp, Talking “Culture”: Gender, Race, Nation, and
the Politics of Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573 (1996).  As Professor Volpp
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the world’s societies and cultures formally endorse the subordina-
tion of women.21 Even in Western societies, consensus on what gen-
der equality means or necessitates is lacking.22 In the United States,
for example, sexual harassment and gender discrimination occur
frequently in the workplace and labor statistics reveal a substantial
wage differential between women and men.23 Sexual harassment
and assault remain a serious problem in educational institutions.24
Although women are a slight majority of the population in the
United States, women still continue to be underrepresented in
leadership positions in the corporate world, in the professional
world and in the political world.25 Minimal representation on enti-
contends, the difficulties inherent in examining cultural differences on gender are
substantial; it may be that different approaches to gender bias may be better studied
by reference to religion, the nation-state or to a regional community.  The differ-
ences, whether cultural, legal, political, or religious should be examined, not ignored
or excused.
21 See Pamela Constable, Afghan Women Are Still Policed: Special Morals Guard Holds
Sway in Herat, Rights Groups Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2002, at A24; Seth Mydans, In
Pakistan, Rape Victims Are the “Criminals,” N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2002, at A3; Asra Q.
Nomani, She Shouldn’t Be Stoned to Death—None of Us Should, WASH. POST, June 1, 2003,
at B1; Norimitsu Onishi, Mother’s Sentence Unsettles a Nigerian Village, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 2002, at A3; Charles Trueheart, Canada Offers Refuge to Persecuted Women, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993, at 9.
22 See, e.g., Sean Pager, Strictness vs. Discretion: The European Court of Justice’s Variable
Vision of Gender Equality, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 553 (2003).
23 “In Fiscal Year 2002, EEOC [U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]
received 14,396 charges of sexual harassment.” EEOC, Sexual Harassment (Jan. 6,
2004), at http://www.eeoc.gov/types/sexual_harassment.html (on file with the New
York City Law Review). Further, in that same year, the EEOC received 25,536 charges
of sex-based discrimination. EEOC, Sex-Based Discrimination (Jan. 6, 2004) at http://
www.eeoc.gov/types/sex.html (on file with the New York City Law Review). See also
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL
AVERAGES (Jan. 10, 2004), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf; Stepha-
nie Boraas & William M. Rodgers III, How Does Gender Play a Role in the Earnings Gap?
An Update, 126 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 90 (2003) available at www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/
2003/03/art2full.pdf.
24 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 634 (Souter, J., dissenting) (2000);
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); see
also Christine N. Carlson, Invisible Victims: Holding the Educational System Liable for Teen
Dating Violence at School, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 351 (2003); Nan Stein, Bullying or
Sexual Harassment? The Missing Discourse of Rights in an Era of Zero Tolerance, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 783 (2003); DONNA EUBEN, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE ACADEMY: SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FACULTY POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES (2002), at http://www.aaup.org/Legal/info%20outlines/legsexha.htm
(on file with the New York City Law Review).
25 See Kirstin Downey, Survey Finds Few Female Directors: No Women Serve on Boards of
54 Fortune 500 Firms, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2003, at E3; Karen Jacobs, Women Have Scaled
Corporate Ladder, But Climb Continues to Be a Slow One, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1999, at B4;
Judy Mann, Pay Discrimination Is No Dirty Little Secret, WASH. POST, June 15, 2001, at C8;
Joseph Menn, First Woman Named to Lead Blue-Chip Firm, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1999, at
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ties such as the U.S. Supreme Court is accepted as sufficient.26 I
further explore this theme by reference to the modern Greek ex-
perience and response to gender bias. Stereotypical views of the
sexes are changing and events or developments have a way of out-
distancing views and attitudes; still, it clearly is a mistake to view the
world as wholeheartedly endorsing the idea that the sexes are enti-
tled to equality of treatment and opportunity, and that this equality
of treatment is enforceable by law.
One aspect of tracking the growth of an emerging global legal
order is the degree to which the Court considers international
norms, decisions of international tribunals, or other nations’ legal
norms. The Supreme Court’s reliance on international norms is
sporadic and inconsistent.  Although international conventions en-
dorse and support gender-equality norms,27 reliance on interna-
tional norms on the issue of gender is problematic because actual
international practice is inconsistent or at least in substantial vari-
ance to the values expressed in conventions and treaties. In addi-
tion, international conventions contain provisions that allow states
to derogate or ignore their obligations in times of emergency or
for elusive and flexible concepts such as “morality” or “public or-
der.”28 Moreover, in the past, the Supreme Court has looked to
A1. For an international comparison, see also Solange De Santis, Canada Trails U.S. in
Naming Women to Board, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1999, at B15; Charles Goldsmith, Norway
Plans to Require Gender Equality in Greater Boardrooms, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A9.
See also Jilian Mincer, Women Find Politics Still an Uphill Path, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003,
at 14 LI.
26 See Bill Miller, Saluting History That’s Not Man-Made, at Ceremony, Pioneering Female
Judges Recall Firsts, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1998, at JO1. See also Mike Allen & Charles
Lane, Bush Set for High Court Battle; Strategy is to Nominate Ideological Conservative, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 2003, at A1; Charles Lane & Amy Goldstein, At High Court, a Retirement
Watch: Rehnquist, O’Connor Top List of Possibilities as Speculation on Replacement Grows,
WASH. POST, June 17, 2001, at A4; Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, Lobbying Starts as
Groups Foresee Vacancy on Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at A1.
27 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”), Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp No. 46, at 194,
U.N. Doc. A/34/46, Art. 4(1) (1979). But see Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention
Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT’L
L. 281 (1991) (reporting that CEDAW has attracted more reservations by states than
any other human rights convention); William A. Schabas, Reservations to the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 79 (1997). The United States has not
yet ratified CEDAW. See CEDAW: States Parties (2004) at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.html (on file with the New York City Law Review).
See also African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58, Art. 2 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
28 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 29 (2) which provides:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose
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international norms in developing legal norms that allowed unbri-
dled governmental actions and discrimination of disfavored classes,
for example, women or resident aliens.29 At other times, the Court
has noted other nations’ legal norms to more sharply delineate
them from our own.30 Recently, some Justices have turned to inter-
national law and international practice in developing American
constitutional norms.31 Justice Ginsburg, in particular, has placed
what tends to be discussed in the literature as a national subject—
race discrimination and affirmative action—in the global context.
Formal recognition and discussion of international law and
the practices of other nations furthers our own ability to compre-
hend and develop our own legal institutions, processes, and norms.
International norms and the actual practices of other countries
serve not just as a barometer of global opinion but may serve also
as a caution or warning of the tenuousness of that norm in the
global order. Discussion of issues like citizenship, race and gender
in their global context, rather than exclusively in their national
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedom of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order
and the general welfare in a democratic society.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29 (2), G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
See also Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exi-
gencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsis-
tent with their other obligations under international law and do not
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion or social origin.
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, art. 4 (1), Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171. See also Oren Gross, “Once More Unto the Breach”: The Systemic Failure
of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J.
INT’L L. 437 (1998); Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public
Emergencies—A Critique of Implementation by the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights and the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, 22 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1
(1981); Rosalyn Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L.
L. 281 (1978).
29 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-11 (1893); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
30 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 35-38 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 78 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Perez v. Brownell, 356
U.S. 44, 79 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 734 (1997); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 707 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting); see also Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers
Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 FED. LAW., Sept. 1998 at 20; Sandra Day O’Connor,
Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J.INT’L. L. & POL. 35 (1996).
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context, may yield a richer font of approaches and solutions; it may
also help build consensus. Moreover, issues like citizenship are in-
herently international and global. Citizenship is important because
national and international legal norms make it important. To dis-
cuss citizenship and its meaning in isolation from the global con-
text is to ignore its role in the international order. These are
functions that have been acknowledged by the Court in the past
and which justify continued reference to international norms and
the practice of nations.
Citizenship is particularly suited to study in reference to
globalization and gender because the relationship established by
citizenship is at the heart of the modern nation-state.  Interna-
tional and other nations’ citizenship norms share the sex bias of
the United States.32 Thus, the international construction of citizen-
ship reflected the traditional and stereotypical understanding of
the role that men and women were to play in society. Citizenship
continues to be central to developing transnational or regional ar-
rangements like the European Union. Thus, it is informed and
constructed by reference to international law. Citizenship, moreo-
ver, is likely to be affected by globalization in the years to come.
The concept of global citizenship does not appear as unattainable
as it may have during the twentieth century.33 Because citizenship
continues to be influenced by gender, discussions of global citizen-
ship should explore its role in norms of citizenship.34
In this article, I first discuss the Supreme Court’s treatment of
gender discrimination in the context of citizenship in the past.
Then, I explore two visions of citizenship reflected in the two most
recent Court decisions exploring the constitutionality of inten-
tional gender discrimination, one of which was authored by Justice
Ginsburg. Finally, I discuss Justice Ginsburg’s use of international
law in the development of constitutional law norms, and I urge its
expansion in application as an appropriate model for continued
international dialogue on gender and citizenship, in particular,
and in human rights law, in general.
32 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 91-93 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
33 PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD (2002).
34 It is beyond the reach of this article to fully discuss the role gender plays in
today’s construction of citizenship in international norms. See Kif Augustine-Adams,
Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of Citizenship and Nation, 41 Va. J. of Int’l Law
93 (2000); Karen Knop, Relational Nationality on Gender and Nationality in International
Law in CITIZENSHIP TODAY, supra note 5.
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I. THE COURT ON CITIZENSHIP AND GENDER—
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
One of the earliest cases to challenge governmental discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex, citizenship, and suffrage is Minor v. Hap-
persett, decided by the Supreme Court in 1874.35 Virginia and
Francis Minor sued the state of Missouri because it refused to regis-
ter Virginia Minor as a voter because she was not a male citizen of
the United States.36 Virginia Minor brought her claim approxi-
mately a decade after passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.
Virginia Minor’s challenge was based on the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which conferred citizenship
on all “persons born . . . in the United States.”37 Moreover, she
argued the amendment prohibited states from making laws that
“abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.”38 As the Court put it,
[t]he argument is, that as a woman, born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is a citizen
of the United States and of the State in which she resides, she
has the right of suffrage as one of the privileges and immunities
of her citizenship, which the State cannot by its laws or constitu-
tion abridge.39
The Court’s logic reflected the plain language of the amend-
ment—“[t]here is no doubt that women may be citizens.”40  The
Court reasoned that citizenship as a concept predated adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Citizenship, thus, was something pos-
sessed by the people who were members of a political community.
Women were persons, the Court noted, and, thus, the mere fact
that they were women did not preclude them from membership in
the political community.41 In exploring what “citizens” or “citizen-
ship” might mean, the Court saw it grounded squarely on member-
ship in a political community.
There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a
political community, such as a nation is, implies an association
of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one
of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation
35 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
36 Minor v. Happersett, 53 Mo. 58 (1873), aff’d, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38 Id.
39 Minor, 88 U.S. at 165.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled
to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connec-
tion, reciprocal obligations. . . . [citizen] is understood as con-
veying the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more.42
The Court’s focus on membership in a political community to
define citizenship might have, if developed, led the Court to a
meaningful concept of citizenship. As that “and nothing more” in-
dicated, however, the Court’s understanding of what membership
in a political community might mean or require was crabbed for it
did not require that Virginia Minor be allowed to vote. Suffrage,
according to this 1875 Court, was not one of the “privileges and
immunities of citizenship.”43
The Court’s decision rested primarily on historical practice
and is consistent with other post-Reconstruction cases interpreting
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a nullity.44 Suffrage, it noted, had been restricted since the
founding of the republic; all states restricted suffrage to white
males of certain ages and some states restricted suffrage to only
white, male, property owners.45 Moreover, the Court reasoned that
citizenship was not necessary to suffrage, as a number of states al-
lowed noncitizen males to vote.46 Therefore, according to this
Court, there seemed to be little link between suffrage and citizen-
ship or membership in a political community. The Court saw itself
bound by historical practice despite the grand break with history
the nation as a whole had witnessed in the Civil War, during Re-
construction, and passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments.
For nearly ninety years the people have acted upon the idea that
the Constitution, when it conferred citizenship, did not necessa-
rily confer the right of suffrage. If uniform practice long contin-
ued can settle the construction of so important an instrument as
the Constitution of the United States confessedly is, most cer-
tainly it has been done here. Our province is to decide what the
law is, not to declare what it should be.47
Plainly, the Minor Court did not deal directly with the issue of
gender equality. Nor does the opinion discuss in any depth what
citizenship might mean or constitute in practice. The opinion con-
42 Id. at 165-66.
43 Id. at 171.
44 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
45 See Minor, 88 U.S. at 172-74.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 177-78.
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tains no reference to the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor does it consider or discuss how differences in sex
roles typical of the late 1800s might be related to or affect citizen-
ship and the right to vote. Virginia Minor’s own family, her role in
the family as an educator and primary caretaker of her children,
and therefore perhaps responsible for the passing of values to her
children, is not considered relevant to her status as citizen.48 The
Court speaks briefly about allegiance and protection, but leaves
these terms undefined.  Similarly, the Court fails to explain how
Virginia Minor, as a citizen, is to express her allegiance. Allegiance,
for this Court, appears to be an attitude rather than a value requir-
ing some recognition of rights and duties or responsibilities.
In the United States, citizens have no obligation under the law
to vote. A substantial number of United States citizens never vote,
even in national elections.49 Thus, perhaps the Minor view that citi-
zenship as a practical matter is disconnected from the franchise is
an accurate view. Of course, there is a vast difference between a
citizen who chooses not to vote, and a citizen who is prohibited
from voting.  Notwithstanding the Court’s view of the relationship
between citizenship and suffrage is likely consistent with the under-
standing of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution.50 That same Congress adopted the Fifteenth Amendment
securing the vote to all male citizens.51 Leaders of the women’s
movement resisted adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
amendments because the amendments did not prohibit denial of
the franchise to women.52 The Court’s view of history is not inaccu-
rate; but this is simply not a Court willing to look to social or politi-
cal developments for an understanding of what the Constitution
may require. The opinion is reminiscent of the Dred Scott decision
in its homage to federalism, state powers, and its understanding of
citizenship.53 Minor v. Happersett places plenary power to prescribe
48 See Karen Knop, Relational Nationality: On Gender and Nationality in International
Law, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY, supra note 5, at 89-124.
49 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEM-
BER 2000 2 (2002) available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf
(reporting that sixty percent of voting-age citizens voted in the November 2000 presi-
dential election).
50 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161 (1979).
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
52 See JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND JUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 143-
50 (1991).
53 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). This similarity has been
noted by others including Joan Hoff. See HOFF, supra note 52, at 173.
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citizenship in states; if citizenship is to be shared by women, then
citizenship will secure few rights, privileges or immunities.
The Court’s concept of citizenship in Minor is singularly void
of substance. To this late nineteenth century court, citizenship
means membership in a political community. Membership, how-
ever, involves or requires only silent allegiance to the political com-
munity from the member, not active participation in the legislative
and political processes.  As a member, the citizen receives protec-
tion, but it is not clear from whom or from what. Neither the con-
cept of allegiance nor protection are delineated or developed by
the Court in any depth. The Court’s construction of citizenship
may have been affected by the need to develop a theory of citizen-
ship that allowed state and federal legislatures to continue to freely
discriminate on the basis of sex.
Forty-one years later, the Court remained constrained in its
concept of citizenship and of gender equality. In Mackenzie v. Hare,
the Court upheld a statute that divested American women, but not
men, of their United States citizenship upon marriage to foreign
nationals without the individual citizen’s consent.54 Mackenzie, like
Minor, raised the issue of gender equality in the context of voting.
The case came to the Court in an interesting posture because it
involved divestiture of citizenship from a person who continued to
reside in the United States after her marriage.55 Ethel Mackenzie
was born in California and met and married Gordon Mackenzie, a
citizen of Great Britain, in California.56 Both Ethel and Gordon
Mackenzie resided in California after their marriage.57
Upon reaching the age of 21, approximately three years after
her marriage, Mackenzie attempted to register as a voter.58 How-
ever, she was not allowed to register, because, the state argued,
upon her marriage to a subject of Great Britain, she had ceased to
be a citizen of the United States.59
In an opinion less than three pages long, the Court readily
dismissed Ethel Mackenzie’s contention that Congress lacked
power to deprive her of citizenship.60 Instead, the Court consid-
54 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). Mackenzie has not been expressly over-
ruled by case law, although its reasoning has been rejected by subsequent cases. See,
e.g., Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). More-
over, the Nineteenth Amendment arguably invalidated the statute.
55 239 U.S. at 306.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 306.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 310-11.
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ered her expatriation to be “voluntary” because the expatriation
occurred as a result of the marriage, “a condition voluntarily en-
tered into, with notice of the consequences.”61 The statute imposed
expatriation as a result of marriage only on American women, not
American men.62 The Court justified this discrimination, and the
brevity of its opinion in denying relief to Ethel Mackenzie, citing
an ancient principle, that of male dominance in a marriage:
[i]t would make this opinion very voluminous to consider in de-
tail the argument and the cases urged in support of or in attack
upon the opposing conditions. Their foundation principles, we
may assume, are known. The identity of husband and wife is an
ancient principle of our jurisprudence. It was neither accidental
nor arbitrary and worked in many instances for her protection.
There has been, it is true, much relaxation of it but in its reten-
tion as in its origin it is determined by their intimate relation
and unity of interests, and this relation and unity may make it of
public concern in many instances to merge their identity, and
give dominance to the husband. It has purpose, if not necessity,
in purely domestic policy; it has greater purpose and, it may be,
necessity, in international policy. And this was the dictate of the
act in controversy. Having this purpose, has it not the sanction
of power?63
Citizenship, the Court acknowledged, had “tangible worth,”
but the Court did not discuss what this “worth” might constitute
and why entering into a marriage might compromise or diminish
the value of citizenship to a woman but not to a man, particularly
in a case in which the couple resided in the woman’s country of
origin.64 Moreover, the Court did not explain why one’s entitle-
ment to citizenship is diminished or affected by marriage, except
by reference to the need to “give dominance to the husband.”65
Perhaps it did not discuss the substance of citizenship in this case
because, as in Minor, only suffrage was at issue. Since suffrage was
not constitutionally necessary for women until passage of the Nine-
teenth Amendment in 1920, to divest a woman of citizenship due
to marriage, without proof of the woman’s actual intent to divest,
did not appear as problematic as if the circumstances were
changed and Ethel Mackenzie was facing deportation as a nonci-
61 Id. at 310, 312.
62 Id. at 307.
63 Id. at 311.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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tizen. Notwithstanding this, it is ultimately citizenship that Ethel
Mackenzie lost, not simply the vote.
Moreover, the Court notes that “a change of citizenship can-
not be arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concur-
rence of the citizen.”66  But it is an illusory consent that the
Constitution required—Ethel Mackenzie had in effect “voluntarily”
relinquished her citizenship by marrying a foreign national.67
Despite the Court’s adherence to a concept of marriage
grounded in the woman’s loss of personal identity, the Court, like
the Minor v. Hapersett Court, ignores the role that a woman or
mother plays in transmitting citizenship values to the children of
the marriage. The Court does not discuss or consider the potential
children of the Mackenzie marriage, their citizenship, and Ethel
Mackenzie’s role as primary caretaker and educator of her chil-
dren. Any children of this marriage, if born in the United States,
would have been American citizens by birth. Because the family
resided in California, they would have been embedded in Ameri-
can culture. The Court, however, does not dwell on the strange
family dynamic that it and Congress create; two noncitizen parents,
one of them originally a native-born American citizen divested of
her citizenship because of her decision to marry, raising American
citizen children on American soil. The children of this family have
more and better rights than either parent. Although the Court ne-
glects these aspects of citizenship and the mother’s role in parent-
ing and educating her children, in the Mackenzie Court’s view of
the marital union, mothers, although subordinate to the father in
the political arena, are primarily responsible for the care of the
children.  Since the father is relieved of primary responsibility for
actual childcare, he is free to be active in public or political affairs,
and to exercise political behavior like voting. Mothers, in this
archaic view of the world, should have a primary role in instilling
and developing citizenship values in children, although legiti-
mately prohibited from living or practicing those values
themselves.
Five years after the Mackenzie v. Hare decision, in 1920, the
Nineteenth Amendment was adopted prohibiting the denial of the
franchise on account of sex in the United States.68
Although the early cases dealing with gender and citizenship
do not explore or focus on the relationship between parent and
66 Id.
67 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 277 n.17 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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child or mother and child, later cases make clear that the Court is
conscious of the role that parents play in educating citizens. In fact,
the Court resolved at least two of its decisions on gender and citi-
zenship by focusing on the parental relationship. In Rogers v. Bel-
lei,69 the Court stressed the value of the male parent in transferring
citizenship. In Nguyen v. INS, on the other hand, little value is ac-
corded the male parent and, theoretically, at least, the mother’s
role in birthing is glorified to an uncomfortably illusive level.70 It
may be that the act of giving birth itself may confer certain rights to
prohibit government regulation of and interference with that par-
ent-child relationship. The right at issue here, however, the right
for a biological parent to transmit citizenship to his or her biologi-
cal child, is at least as important to parents who raise the child or
who exercise responsibility for the child, as to those who do not.
Bellei, decided in 1971, reflects the Mackenzie view of sex and
parenting.
Bellei is not a case that, on its facts, posed a sex or gender dis-
crimination issue; it is a case in which the Court injected a note of
sex discrimination. The case was brought by a young man, Aldo
Bellei, born in Italy to an alien father and a U.S. citizen mother.71
At the time, citizenship statutes required that a child of a U.S. citi-
zen parent born abroad, whether mother or father, live continu-
ously in the United States for a period of at least five years between
the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight.72 Failure to comply with the
continuous residence requirement resulted in the child’s loss of
citizenship.73 The United States treated Aldo Bellei as an American
citizen from birth until he was twenty-four years of age when the
United States Embassy in Italy refused to renew his passport and
informed him that he was no longer considered a citizen.74 The
statute at issue in Bellei was a gender neutral statute. Bellei argued
that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
because it deprived him of his citizenship involuntarily.75 A three-
judge panel on the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, reasoning that
the Due Process Clause restricted Congress’ power to divest per-
69 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
70 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
71 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 817 (1971).
72 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414 § 301(b), 66 Stat. 236
(repealed 1978).
73 Bellei, 401 U.S. at 819-820.
74 Id. at 819.
75 Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969), rev’d sub nom., Rogers v. Bellei, 401
U.S. 815 (1971).
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sons of citizenship absent fraud.76
The Court determined that the kind of citizenship that Bellei
possessed, derivative citizenship, was not the kind of citizenship
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.77 Derivative citizenship
by blood, jus sanguinis, under United States law was neither birth-
right nor naturalized citizenship, the Court reasoned.78 Since the
Fourteenth Amendment spoke only to birth-right and naturalized
citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment simply did not apply to
Bellei and other beneficiaries of derivative citizenship.79 Thus, de-
rivative citizenship, until formalized by a naturalization process,
the Court indicated, was not protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and impliedly, thus, received lesser protection under the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
The Court went on to hold that Congress had the power to
place restrictions or conditions on derivative citizenship including
a five-year period of continuous residence in the United States.80
The Court applied a ‘reasonableness’ standard; that is, as long as
the conditions on retention of citizenship are not “unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unlawful,” they withstood constitutional challenge.81
The Court reasoned that dual citizenship posed a problem because
the individual would be torn between two countries to which she or
he owed allegiance.82 Thus, the Court noted, requiring a period of
residence for a nonresident citizen was reasonable and consistent
with promoting dedicated attachment to the United States.83
There are many problems with this decision, in particular, the
idea that derivative citizenship is not protected by the Constitution
to the same extent as birth-right citizenship or naturalized citizen-
76 Id. at 1252.
77 Bellei, 401 U.S. at 827-31.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 827. The Court stated:
[t]he central fact, in our weighing of the plaintiff’s claim to continuing
and therefore current United States citizenship, is that he was born
abroad. He was not born in the United States. He was not naturalized in
the United States. And he has not been subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. All this being so, it seems indisputable that the first sen-
tence of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to plaintiff Bel-
lei. He simply is not a Fourteenth Amendment-first-sentence citizen.
80 Id. at 834-36.
81 Id. at 831.
82 Id. at 832. Of course, the problems raised by dual citizenship are faced by indi-
viduals who are born in the United States as well by those who have one or two par-
ents who are foreign nationals. Thus, dual citizenship concerns do not appear to
justify the different treatment of naturalized, birthright and derivative citizens.
83 Id. at 834-35.
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ship.84 The Court also ascribes the function of providing “an ex-
press constitutional definition of citizenship” to an earlier decision,
United States v. Wong Kim Ark.85 The constitutional definition of citi-
zenship in Wong Kim Ark, however, was limited to determining who
is a citizen under the Constitution, not what citizenship involved or
what citizenship comprehensively meant under the Constitution.86
But it is the Court’s injection of gender into a case that did not
pose a gender issue on which I focus. The statute here did not
differentiate between derivative citizenship passed through
mothers and fathers. Regardless of whether the father or mother
transferred citizenship, the child had to comply with the five-year
continuous residence requirement.87 Nevertheless, the Court, in
upholding the statute, comes close to resting its decision on the
fact that Aldo Bellei had derived his citizenship through his
mother, rather than through his father.88 The Court noted that
prior to 1934, Congress had provided for derivative citizenship
only for U.S. citizen fathers of children born abroad—maternal
U.S. citizenship provided no benefit until 1934, so the Court omi-
nously warned, had Bellei been born before 1934, he would have
had no claim to citizenship at all.89
Still, the Court reasoned, the fact that Bellei took his citizen-
ship through his mother justified the continuous residence re-
quirement and justified divesting him of citizenship involuntarily,
even though the requirement was imposed by statute on children
who derive their citizenship through either their father or their
mother.90 As the Court noted,
[t]he Congress has an appropriate concern with problems at-
tendant on dual nationality. . . . These problems are particularly
acute when it is the father who is the child’s alien parent and the father
chooses to have his family reside in the country of his own nationality.
The child is reared, at best, in an atmosphere of divided loyalty.
We cannot say that a concern that the child’s own primary alle-
giance is to the country of his birth and of his father’s allegiance
is either misplaced or arbitrary.91
84 Id. at 830-31. But see id. at 836-45 (Black, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 830 (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)).
86 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 687-694 (1898) (holding that a child
born in the United States of Chinese parents is a citizen of the United States under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
87 Id. at 831.
88 Id. at 831-32.
89 Id. at 826.
90 Id. at 831-32.
91 Id. at 831-32 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The Bellei Court forgets, however, that residence in the United
States failed to help Ethel Mackenzie. The Bellei Court seems al-
most hostile to maternal derivative citizenship. However, a com-
plete turn-around comes about on maternal-derivative citizenship
with the Nguyen Court.
II. THE MODERN COURT ON GENDER AND CITIZENSHIP—REAL
DIFFERENCES AND OVERBROAD GENERALIZATIONS
ABOUT THE SEXES
Nguyen v. INS was brought by a U.S. citizen father, Joseph Bou-
lais, and his foreign-born son, Tuan Anh Nguyen.92 The son, a
nonmarital child, was born in Vietnam and was raised by his father
almost from birth.93 Joseph Boulais brought his son back to the
United States when Nguyen was six years old in 1975, when the
government of South Vietnam fell to communist forces.94  Nguyen
was admitted first as a refugee and then as a permanent resident
alien on July 10, 1975.95 Boulais raised Nguyen in the United
States, but did not go through the formal legal process acknowl-
edging his paternity while Nguyen was a minor.96 DNA testing con-
ducted after Nguyen’s citizenship was placed in issue, however,
established that it was 99.98% certain that Boulais was Nguyen’s
biological father.97 Nguyen did not go through a process of
naturalization.98
92 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). The Court confronted the issue raised in the
Nguyen case in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). In Miller a majority of the Court
did not consider the merits of the equal protection claim. For a discussion of Miller
and the role that gender stereotypes play in the case, see Augustine-Adams, supra note
34; see also Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary
Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT.
REV. 1 (1999).
93 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
94 Id. at 57.
95 Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 2000), aff’d by, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
Tuan was admitted as a lawful permanent resident alien on July 10, 1975 pursuant to
the Indochinese Refugee Act, Title 1 of Pub. L. No. 95-145 (October 28, 1977). Re-
cord at 183. [Hereinafter Record.] (Reviewed by the author and on file with the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.)
96 Nguyen, 208 F. 3d at 531. When the South Vietnamese fell, Tuan was in the care
of Boulais’s girlfriend’s mother, as Boulais was out of the country. Tuan and his (even-
tually) step-grandmother fled Saigon with American assistance. His step-grandmother
claimed to be Tuan’s mother at the time of their evacuation. The facts of Tuan’s birth
and true parentage were never corrected in official records. Petitioner’s Opening
Brief at 5, Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, No. 98-60418 (Jan. 12, 1999).
97 Nguyen, 208 F. 3d at 530 n.1; see also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 85 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
98 Nguyen, 208 F. 3d at 532 (stating that Nguyen claimed to have citizenship by
birth and noting that birth and naturalization are the only two sources of citizenship).
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In 1992 when Nguyen was twenty-two, he was convicted of two
counts of sexual assault on a child and sentenced to eight years in
prison on each count.99 These offenses render a permanent resi-
dent alien deportable.100 In the American legal system, deporta-
tions of noncitizens are civil proceedings.101 These proceedings are
entitled to little judicial review and aliens possess diminished con-
stitutional rights in defending themselves against deportation.102
Thus, for most aliens, deportations are accomplished through an
administrative proceeding with little, if any, judicial review.103
Three years after his conviction, in 1995, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) initiated deportation proceedings
against Nguyen as an alien who had been convicted of two crimes
99 Id. at 530.
100 Id.
101 Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 590 (1913); see Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893); Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of
the British Practice of Banishment and its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. 115 (1999).
102 Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984)
(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation proceedings).
103 The procedural history of the Nguyen case is instructive in conveying the laby-
rinthian, complex and confusing process deportation cases now follow in the Ameri-
can legal system. Only the most fantastic of legal fictions describes this process as due
process. Nguyen was not represented by counsel at the hearing in which his de-
portability and citizenship status were initially determined. Aliens do not enjoy a con-
stitutional right to counsel in a deportation hearing. Moreover, the deportation
determination was made by a judge who lacks Article III status and serves directly
under the Attorney General. See M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review—A Nice Thing?
Article III, Separation of Powers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996, 29 CONN.L.REV. 1525 (1997). That decision was appealed to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) and the BIA dismissed the appeal. Nguyen,
208 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 2000), aff’d by, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). Despite the fact that by
the time the BIA decided the case Nguyen had submitted to the BIA the “Order of
Parentage” from a Texas district court declaring Joseph Boulais to be Nguyen’s father
and declaring that “the parent-child relationship exists between the father and the
child for all purposes,” as well as the results of DNA testing, the BIA order dismissing
Nguyen’s appeal stated only that: “We note your claim that you are entitled to deriva-
tive United States citizenship. We observe that at your deportation hearing you admit-
ted that you are a native of Vietnam. . . . Having admitted your foreign birth, you are
presumed to be an alien. However, you failed to provide the Immigration Judge with
evidence to support your citizenship claim. You have not sustained your burden of
going forward with evidence establishing your claim of citizenship.” Record supra note
95, at 62-63.
Nguyen filed a motion to reconsider with the BIA, which apparently has never
been decided. Id. Concurrently, Nguyen filed a habeas corpus petition in federal dis-
trict court challenging the deportation order and the denial of relief from deporta-
tion and asking for a declaratory judgment on citizenship. Id. Nguyen also appealed
the BIA’s order of deportation to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. Id. at 531-32.
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involving moral turpitude, and as an aggravated felon.104 Before
the immigration judge, Nguyen argued that he was a citizen of the
United States because he was the son of a United States citizen.105
The hearing was adjourned to allow Nguyen time to present evi-
dence of citizenship.106 At the second hearing, Nguyen’s attorney
withdrew.107 The judge proceeded with the hearing with Nguyen
unrepresented by counsel.108 Nguyen testified at that hearing that
he was not a citizen of the United States but was a citizen of Viet-
nam.109 The immigration judge found him deportable.110 Nguyen
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).111 While the
appeal to the BIA was pending, his father obtained an order of
parentage from a state court, based on DNA testing.112 The immi-
gration appellate court denied Nguyen’s appeal on the grounds
that he was not a citizen because his father had failed to comply
with 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), which provides for transmission of citizen-
ship by birth to nonmarital children born abroad of U.S. citizen
fathers and noncitizen-mothers.113 Specifically, the BIA reasoned
that Boulais had failed to legitimate their father-son relationship
through some formal legal process prior to Nguyen’s eighteenth
birthday, as required by the statute.114 Nguyen appealed his case to
the federal courts, which anyone claiming American citizenship
104 Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 57 (2001).
105 Id.




110 Id. at 531.
111 The BIA is the administrative appellate court that in most immigration cases
provides the only and final merit review of immigration judges’ legal and factual find-
ings. BIA judges and the review process are subject to complete control by the Attor-
ney General of the United States. Recently, the immigration appeals process was
streamlined to sharply curtail meaningful review of immigration judges’ decisions. 67
Fed. Reg. 54878-54905 (Aug. 26, 2002). See Dia v. Ashcroft, F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003)
(upholding streamlining regulations as consistent with the federal immigration stat-
ute and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); see also Soadjede v. Ashcroft,
324 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v. United States Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283 (11th
Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2003); Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d
365 (1st Cir. 2003); DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR: THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO, RE:
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGE-
MENT 20 (2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyABA_8mg
PDF.pdf.
112 Nguyen, 208 F. 3d at 531.
113 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
114 Nguyen, 208 F. 3d at 533.
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may do,115 on the grounds that he was a United States’ citizen, be-
cause, to the extent that the statute that granted derivative citizen-
ship distinguished between the children of U.S. citizen mothers
and U.S. citizen fathers and placed a more substantial burden on
fathers than on mothers, the sex-based distinction violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.116
Under the statute, nonmarital foreign-born children of U.S.
citizen mothers may claim derivative citizenship on the basis of a
birth certificate identifying the U.S. citizen as the mother of the
nonmarital child, as long as the mother was a U.S. citizen at the
time of birth and as long as the mother had previously been physi-
cally present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions
for a continuous period of at least one year.117  The statute does
not require that the mother have raised the child or have provided
financial or other support to the child at any time after her or his
birth.
U.S. citizens who are fathers of nonmarital foreign born chil-
dren, however, are required, before the child reaches the age of
eighteen, to take one of three affirmative steps, all of which require
some form of legal process: legitimating, declaration of paternity
under oath by the father, or court order of paternity.118 In addi-
115 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) (2004); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (repealed 1996) (pre-
ceding 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(5)).
116 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 56-58.
117 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (c) (2004) (providing that:
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a
person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and
out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality
status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United
States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previ-
ously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying
possessions for a continuous period of one year).
118 Id. at §1409(a) (providing that:
§ 1409. Children born out of wedlock
(a) The provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (g) of section [1401
of this title], and of paragraph (2) of section [1408 of this title], shall
apply as of the date of birth to a person born out of wedlock if—
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the
person’s birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide finan-
cial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years,
and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years—
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence or
domicile,
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tion, the statute requires that “a blood relationship between the
person and the father is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence,”119 and that “the father (unless deceased) has agreed in
writing to provide financial support for the person until the person
reaches the age of eighteen years.”120
The federal appellate court rejected Nguyen’s appeal and the
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.121 A five-justice majority
upheld the statute’s distinction on the basis of sex finding that the
challenged “classification served important governmental objec-
tives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.”122 The court identi-
fied two important governmental objectives: first, the importance
of ensuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists be-
tween the U.S. citizen parent and the child claiming citizenship;123
and second:
the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen par-
ent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to de-
velop not just a relationship that is recognized, as a formal
matter, by the law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties
that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and,
in turn, the United States.124
Both of these interests were furthered by the sex differential,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under
oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a com-
petent court.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 405 [of this Act], the provi-
sions of section [1401(g) of this title] shall apply to a child born out of
wedlock on or after January 13, 1941, and before December 24, 1952, as
of the date of birth, if the paternity of such child is established at any
time while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by
legitimization.
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a
person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and
out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality
status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United
States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previ-
ously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying
possessions for a continuous period of one year).
119 Id. at §1409(a)(1).
120 Id. at §1409(a)(3).
121 Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2000), aff’d by 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
122 Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Stevens. Justice
O’Connor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, wrote a dissenting opin-
ion. Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 61.
124 Id. at 64-65.
338 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:315
according to the court, because of the biological difference in ac-
tual birth between mothers and fathers.125 As to the first interest,
the Court stated that mothers and fathers are not similarly situated
with regard to the proof of biological parenthood because the
mother will always be at the birth itself.126 As the Court noted,
“[t]he mother’s status is documented in most instances by the birth
certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her
having given birth,” and giving birth is generally incontrovertible
proof of the biological tie between mother and child.127 The fa-
ther, on the other hand, does not have to be present at the birth,
and even if he is, his presence is “not incontrovertible proof of
fatherhood.”128 Since they are not similarly situated vis a` vis the
proof of biological parenthood, there is no constitutional require-
ment that the government treat them similarly. To be sure, this is
not a court looking toward the future of human biology and birth,
not even considering the reality of assisted reproductive technol-
ogy and how alternative human reproduction techniques might af-
fect its concept of derivative citizenship.129
Similarly, this Court is not interested in an actual blood-tie or
“biological parenthood” whatever that term might mean, nor does
it require that Congress be interested in an actual blood-tie be-
tween parent and child or actual biological parenthood.130 Proof of
birth from a nonmarital mother through birth certificates or other
evidence of birth will suffice to establish the mother-child relation-
125 Id. at 65-66.
126 Id. at 62.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Symposium: Pushing the Boundaries: An Interdis-
ciplinary Examination of New Reproductive Technology: The Process of Regulating Assisted Re-
productive Technologies: What We Can Learn from our Neighbors—What Translates and What
Does Not, 45 LOY.L.REV. 247 (1999).
130 The difficulties inherent in the concept of an actual blood-tie or “biological
parenthood” today are demonstrated by the following fact pattern:
A female French citizen has a partner who is a dual citizen, American
and Canadian, also a female. They have two children conceived by artifi-
cial insemination with anonymous sperm obtained through a California
clinic. Both children were born in Canada and were carried by a dual
American-Canadian citizen. Both children have the same biological fa-
ther, but one of the children is biologically a descendant of the French
mother who has provided her eggs for in vitro fertilization. In other
words, one child is the biological descendant of two American citizens,
the other child is the biological descendant of an American father
whose identity is unknown, a biological mother who is French but who
was carried by an American citizen up to birth. Can that child claim U.S.
citizenship?
The author thanks Professor Stephen Legomsky for providing this fact pattern.
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ship at any time the child wishes to claim citizenship; but not so for
the child born abroad of a U.S. citizen nonmarital father.
Moreover, in the view of this Court, both mothers and fathers
appear to be typified by the worst in human sexual behavior pat-
terns—both males and females apparently are prone to promiscu-
ous and irresponsible sexual behavior, inevitably, apparently,
leading to childbirth. Women and mothers, in particular, are
prone to lies and deception about their sexual behavior to their
sexual partner. The image of an expectant father at a birth event
who is not really the father because the mother has tricked him or,
worse, does not know the identity of the real father, is a powerful
and accurate image in the eyes of this Supreme Court majority.
As to the second interest, ensuring an opportunity for a mean-
ingful relationship between the parent and child that will facilitate
transmission of American culture and values, the Court notes that
again the biological difference between mothers and fathers of
children born overseas justifies the difference in treatment.131 In
the case of the mother, the Court notes:
the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen
parent and child inheres in the very event of birth, an event so
often critical to our constitutional and statutory understandings
of citizenship. The mother knows that the child is in being and
is hers and has an initial point of contact with him. There is at
least an opportunity for mother and child to develop a real,
meaningful relationship.132
In the case of the unwed father, however, the same opportunity
does not result from the birth. The father may not know that a
child was conceived; or similarly, the mother may not even know
the father’s identity.133 After all, the Court implies, most of these
children are likely to be the children of military, most of whom are
male and young and apparently, in the view of this Court, ex-
tremely promiscuous and irresponsible, more so than the average
American man and woman.134 Moreover, the Court notes:
When we turn to the conditions which prevail today, we find
that the passage of time has produced additional and even more
substantial grounds to justify the statutory distinction. The ease
of travel and the willingness of Americans to visit foreign coun-
tries have resulted in numbers of trips abroad that must be of
real concern when we contemplate the prospect of accepting
131 Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 64-65 (2001).
132 Id. at 65.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 65-66.
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petitioners’ argument, which would mandate, contrary to Con-
gress’ wishes, citizenship by male parentage subject to no condi-
tion save the father’s previous length of residence in this
country. In 1999 alone, Americans made almost 25 million trips
abroad, excluding trips to Mexico. . . . Visits to Canada and Mex-
ico add to this figure almost 34 million additional visits. . . . And
the average American overseas traveler spent 15.1 nights out of
the United States in 1999.135
The Court does not do the arithmetic, but the implication of these
numbers is clear: a potential fifty-nine million U.S. citizen children
born abroad each year—and if the traveler is a male, the number
may increase by fourteen children per traveler per year! “Principles
of equal protection do not require Congress to ignore this reality,”
the Court concludes.136
The majority opinion emphasizes biological differences, but,
as the dissent points out, this case is not about biological differ-
ences, but about fairly broad and overdrawn stereotypes that bear
almost no similarity or relationship to the case before the Court, or
to the actual behavior patterns of most American women or
men.137 Thus, the statute imposes a gender differential on the basis
of gender stereotypes about males and females—men as irresponsi-
ble, promiscuous sexual predators and women either as more re-
sponsible, nurturing parents whose bonding with the child at birth
is likely to ensure a meaningful relationship with the child
(whether the mother ever sees the child again or not), or as willing
participants in promiscuous and irresponsible sex, so much so that
she or he will never be sure who a child’s father really is.
The Court’s view of the statutory difference between
nonmarital mothers and fathers reflects still another stereotype—
that anyone who engages in sex outside marriage is promiscuous
and irresponsible. But if this is the stereotype behind Congress’s
statutory requirements for derivative citizenship in the case of
nonmarital children, it would justify similar treatment of the sexes,
not differential treatment.
Perhaps, as well, the differential reflects the view that U.S.
mothers of nonmarital children born abroad are more likely to re-
turn with their children to the United States than U.S. fathers, be-
cause, as a general matter, mothers are more likely than fathers to
retain primary caretaker or custodial status over their marital or
135 Id. at 66.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420, 460-471 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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nonmarital children.138 This difference in parenting roles, how-
ever, that men and women tend to or are expected to play is at the
heart of gender stereotypes. It is the difference that the Minor
Court used to deny Virginia Minor the vote and another woman,
Myra Bradwell, a license to practice law.139 It is a difference that
has been eliminated for the most part in American family law. It is
a difference that, at heart, has nothing to do with sex or gender but
with the exercise of parental responsibility.140 The statutory sex-
based distinction does not just make it easier for nonmarital chil-
dren of U.S. citizen mothers to establish derivative citizenship; it
also imposes a substantial burden on the U.S. citizen father that if
not fulfilled prohibits him from passing on citizenship to his
nonmarital children born abroad.
The Court’s opinion strains to find a substantial relationship
between the difference in treatment between the sexes and the
goal it says Congress is trying to achieve—ensuring that an oppor-
tunity for a parent-child relationship during a child’s formative
years exists. Its attempt to do so, however, is unconvincing. The
Court appears to be saying that the fact that a woman has carried a
child until birth provides an opportunity for a meaningful relation-
ship to form between mother and child that a father will not have
because fathers do not physically carry children. Bearing the child,
however, does not provide an opportunity to transmit values. It
138 See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 88-89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Miller, 523 U.S.
at 486-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (holding that state bar exclu-
sion of women from the practice of law does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment);
see also U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 543-44 (1996) (“VMI”).
140 Justice Kennedy’s opinion attempts to rebut the claim that the difference be-
tween nonmarital mothers and nonmarital fathers rests on stereotypes by defining
stereotypes “as a frame of mind resulting from irrational or uncritical analysis.”
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68. Contrast this understanding of gender stereotypes with the
discussion of gender stereotypes in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), or VMI, 518
U.S. 515. The Nguyen opinion goes on to explain:
There is nothing irrational or improper in the recognition that at the
moment of birth—a critical event in the statutory scheme and in the
whole tradition of citizenship law—the mother’s knowledge of the child
and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way not guaran-
teed in the case of the unwed father. This is not a stereotype.
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 68. I am reminded of Gertrude Stein’s “there is no there there.”
GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (Vintage Books 1973) (1937).
Nguyen’s approach to stereotypes is reminiscent of the Court’s approach in Michael M.
v. Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a statutory rape statute limited to
male perpetrators). See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 997 (2002); Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Prem-
ises Infecting Reproductive Rights, 5 AM. U. J. Gender & L. 147 (1996); Ann E. Freedman,
Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 932 (1983).
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may make sense for Congress to require a parent-child relationship
that facilitates an education in and appreciation of, American his-
tory, culture and values for transmission of citizenship. But to con-
tend that the period of time a fetus spends in the uterus and the
period of time spent in actual birth is material to transmission of
citizenship strains credulity. It is the period of time after birth, dur-
ing a child’s formative years, that is material for transmission of
values. With respect to this period of time, the nonmarital father is
in a similar position toward forming or developing a relationship
with his child, at least in theory, as the nonmarital mother. Further,
the amount of time a fetus spends in the uterus is the same for
both marital and nonmarital children. Let us assume that because
the law presumes that children born in a marriage are fathered by
the male spouse of the marriage (regardless of actual blood-tie or
biological parentage), it is rational to treat marital and nonmarital
children differently. The difference in treatment would be rational
because the marital father bears parental responsibility for the
child as a matter of law. Both marital fathers and mothers, thus, are
similarly situated with respect to their marital children. With re-
gard to nonmarital children, it makes sense, then, to require that a
parent transmitting citizenship to a child bear legal responsibility
for the child. The statute challenged in Nguyen may have reflected
an attempt by Congress to ensure that, in the case of nonmarital
children, only parents who financially supported and cared for
their children received the benefit of transmitting U.S. citizenship.
Although such a scheme may be faulted for failing to take into ac-
count the interests of the child, if applied to both mothers and
fathers, it would be a reasonable way of distinguishing between
marital and nonmarital children. But the Nguyen statute does not
draw that distinction. Instead, it relies on old and tired stereotypes
about men and women and their respective relationships to chil-
dren, requiring responsible parenting by men but not by women.
Moreover, the opinion, taken as a whole, emphasizes the “min-
imal” nature of the burden the statute places on the father. But
requiring an individual to engage in some kind of formal legal pro-
cess, when such legal process is actually unnecessary to care for a
child and enjoy custody over that child, is not a minimal burden.
The Court dismisses the fact that the father may not even know of
the statutory requirements for derivative citizenship until after de-
portation proceedings have begun. To describe the statutory re-
quirements imposed on the father as opposed to the mother
(upon whom no burdens are imposed other than giving birth to
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the child) as posing a minimal burden is facile. At no point in the
Nguyen opinion does the Court indicate any awareness that the ste-
reotypes on which its reasoning rests are flatly contradicted by the
actual facts of the case before it; it is as if Joseph Boulais and Tuan
Anh Nguyen are not before the Court at all.141
Missing in this opinion, as in all the other opinions discussed,
is a coherent and clear concept of what citizenship is or might be,
and how relationships, including family relationships, may affect
citizenship. The Court remains unwilling to articulate a vision or
concept of citizenship informed by constitutional principles. This
unwillingness to articulate a concept of citizenship does not mean
that the Court’s opinions fail to convey a vision of citizenship,
rather, it is simply an undeveloped vision lacking consistency, co-
herence and meaning for society.
This omission is most glaring in the Court’s characterization
of the interests that the government seeks to vitiate in the statute.
The Court characterizes the government’s interests to ensure that
there is a blood relationship between the parent and the
nonmarital child, and to ensure that there is an opportunity for a
meaningful relationship between the U.S. citizen parent and the
child born abroad.142 The first interest, the blood relationship, is
the determinative factor in derivative citizenship. Citizenship by
blood traditionally furnished the basis for transmission of citizen-
ship. The problem, of course, is that in both the case of the
nonmarital mother and nonmarital father, the best evidence of the
blood relationship may be DNA testing, not a birth certificate or a
legitimating process.
It is the second interest, to ensure a meaningful relationship
between parent and child, which creates the more substantial prob-
lem with the statutory scheme and the Court’s treatment of that
scheme. The Court stresses the importance of the opportunity to
form a meaningful relationship between parent and child and ne-
glects to explore whether the real interest that could or should be
pursued is whether there has been a meaningful parent-child rela-
141 Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Constitutional adjudication rests on
the idea that the Court is in the best posture to decide challenges to governmental
action when persons with much to lose have actually had those interests affected.
Presumably, the record developed in such a case is to be of use or service to the Court
in explaining why the statute is or is not constitutionally problematic. The Nguyen
Court ignores the facts of the case; its discussion and reasoning is unaffected and
completely removed from the actual factual circumstances that have given rise to the
claim.
142 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62, 64.
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tionship between the citizen parent and the biological child at all.
The statute at issue in Nguyen plainly required that a meaningful
relationship exist between a U.S. citizen father and his nonmarital
child in order for that child to enjoy U.S. citizenship.  The statute,
however, merely assumed that a meaningful relationship existed
between the U.S. citizen mother and her nonmarital child, as a
consequence of birth. It is precisely this type of assumption about
stereotypical sex roles that equal protection doctrine prohibits.
The Court’s unwillingness to explore what actual interest Congress
may constitutionally vitiate through naturalization and citizenship
statutes similarly frustrates development of an informed concept of
citizenship. One could argue that it is not the Court’s role to artic-
ulate such a vision, but only to decide actual cases before it. Per-
haps it is the role of the legislature to give meaning to this concept
of citizenship. That is, to an extent, what the Nguyen majority seems
to be expressing with its deference to Congress’s decision to penal-
ize U.S. fathers and their nonmarital children born abroad and to
favor U.S. mothers and their nonmarital children born abroad. But
it is the Court’s role in the American constitutional scheme to in-
terpret the Constitution and enforce its provisions, in particular, its
guarantees of basic human rights. The Nguyen case embraces a view
of gender and citizenship at odds with the Court’s own legal norms
of gender equality.143 That the Court may have abdicated an op-
portunity to develop a coherent concept of citizenship upon adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, does not prevent it from
embarking upon the task today.
One vision of citizenship in the context of gender that is based
on an honest and realistic measure of each individual’s potential
and abilities is that presented in the case of the United States v.
Virginia.144
VMI was decided in 1996. The case does not appear to involve
citizenship at all. Thus, I may be accused of injecting citizenship
notions into a case having nothing to do with it, in the same way
that I have criticized the Bellei Court for injecting gender into a
case that does not raise the issue at all. Like the Bellei Court, I will
live with that criticism.
The VMI case involved a challenge to the Virginia Military In-
stitute’s single-sex admissions policy on the grounds that the
school’s male-only policy discriminated on the basis of sex in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
143 See, e.g., VMI, 518 U.S. 515.
144 Id.
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ment.145 In perhaps the strongest opinion on gender
discrimination issued by the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg ac-
knowledged Virginia’s aim in its single-sex policy:
VMI’s distinctive mission is to produce “citizen-soldiers,” men
prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service.
VMI pursues this mission through pervasive training of a kind
not available anywhere else in Virginia. Assigning prime place to
character development, VMI uses an “adversative method”
modeled on English public schools and once characteristic of
military instruction. VMI constantly endeavors to instill physical
and mental discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong
moral code. The school’s graduates leave VMI with heightened
comprehension of their capacity to deal with duress and stress,
and a large sense of accomplishment for completing the hazard-
ous course.146
But, as the lower Court had noted, “neither the goal of producing
citizen-soldiers nor VMI’s implementing methodology is inherently
unsuitable to women.”147 Therefore, the Court concluded, the sin-
gle-sex policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.148 Both the Nguyen and VMI courts applied
the same test to determine whether the gender differential violated
norms of equality; the way the two courts applied the test, however,
is substantially different. Both opinions state that governmental dis-
tinctions on the basis of sex must not be based on overbroad gener-
alizations about men and women, but instead must be based on
real differences between the sexes.149  The Nguyen Court’s view of a
real difference, however, is hard to understand as anything other
than gross cultural stereotypes about female and male behavior
patterns. For the Nguyen Court, the behavior of a few members of
either sex will doom every member of the group to be tainted by
whatever characteristic the Court deems to be “representative” of
the group.
The Nguyen Court sought to mask its reliance on overbroad
stereotypes about the sexes by its continued insistence that it was
biological differences, in its view real differences, that justified the
difference in treatment. As explained by Justice Ginsburg, how-
ever, “[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or in-
vented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on
145 Id. at 523.
146 Id. at 520.
147 Id. at 525 (quoting U.S. v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)).
148 Id. at 519.
149 Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53, 76 (2001); VMI, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
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overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.”150 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg
continued, “[i]nherent differences between men and women, we
have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial con-
straints on an individual’s opportunity.”151 In contrast to the
Nguyen majority, the VMI majority attempts to deal with potential
differences between men as a group and women as a group in a
realistic and honest way, while allowing individual members of
both groups to compete on the same playing field.
Virginia advanced two interests or justifications in defending
the exclusion of women.152 First, Virginia claimed that VMI’s male-
only policy provided educational benefits and diversity in educa-
tional approaches.153 Second, Virginia argued that the school’s ad-
versative approach, described as VMI’s unique “method of
character development and leadership training,” would have to be
modified if women were admitted.154
The Court rejected the first justification because it was not a
justification that the State had actually relied on in making the in-
stitution male only but had been developed after the litigation
commenced.155 The historical record simply did not support a
finding that Virginia had sought to advance diverse educational op-
tions in its single sex policy at VMI; rather, the Court noted, VMI’s
policy simply afforded “a unique educational benefit only to
males.”156
The Court also rejected the second justification, that admit-
ting women to VMI would destroy VMI’s program because their
participation would eliminate the adversative approach.157 The
Court, however, reasoned that although admission of women to
the program would require accommodation of some kind (hous-
ing and physical training programs), it would not destroy the ad-
versative method.158
The Court assumed first that many men and women are not
interested in pursuing the VMI approach.159 It also noted the dis-
150 Id. at 533.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 535.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 540.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 540-46.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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trict court’s findings that some women, like some men, are capable
of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets.160 Moreo-
ver, the Court noted, “the parties agree that some women can meet
the physical standards VMI now imposes on men.”161 In fact, the
Court had evidence before it that indicated that approximately ten
percent of women would be able to meet the physical standards
VMI imposed on men.162 Thus, the fact that a particular stereotype
or generalization might hold true for “most” women, did not justify
exclusion of all women from the program.163  Similarly, it was not
material that more men than women may pursue and be successful
at VMI; rather the question the Court identified is “whether [Vir-
ginia] can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and
capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI
uniquely affords.”164
The Court rejected the argument that exclusion of women is
essential to preserving the character and mission of the VMI pro-
gram. As Justice Ginsburg wrote:
VMI’s mission: to produce “citizen-soldiers,” individuals imbued
with love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of
leadership, possessing a high sense of public service, advocates
of the American democracy and free enterprise system, and
ready to defend their country in time of national peril. . . .
Surely that goal is great enough to accommodate women, who
today count as citizens in our American democracy equal in stat-
ure to men.165
Setting aside for the moment whether the VMI vision of “citizen-
ship” is a particularly good one, it is at least a vision of citizenship
that requires actual equality in the sense of affording all the oppor-
tunity to participate in the endeavor. It is a vision that does not
mask differences; it acknowledges them but does not make more of
them than is warranted. The VMI decision upholds a vision of
equality that does not guarantee that everyone will have access to
the resources, only that one will have the opportunity for access on
the strength of one’s abilities. The VMI opinion celebrates the indi-
vidual—what it guarantees is that one is to be treated as an individ-
ual and not as a member of the group, particularly when the group
stereotype is a negative stereotype used by the state to deny an indi-




164 Id. at 542.
165 Id. at 545 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1425 (1991)).
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vidual a benefit, right, or privilege. It is this guarantee that is miss-
ing in the Nguyen Court’s analysis and holding. Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion speaks with an honesty and frankness completely missing
from the majority opinion in the Nguyen case.
A. Globalization, Gender, and International Law
Globalization is inevitable. It will not obscure differences. It
may be shaped, however, and we should be actively involved in its
shaping.
As Peter Singer notes in the preface to his recent book on
globalization, One World, in the aftermath of September 11, the war
against Iraq and, now, the post-Iraq war, exploring the concept of
globalization appears strained.166 Plainly, today, the world appears
divided, whether or not it is actually more divided than at any
other time in the past.
But as Professor Singer notes in the context of September 11
and America’s response to the attack:
confirms rather than denies the idea of a world that is increas-
ingly becoming one, for it shows that no country, however
mighty, is invulnerable to deadly force from the far corners of
the earth. An American administration that had previously
shown little concern for the opinion of the rest of the world
found itself in need of the cooperation of other nations in a
global campaign against terrorism.167
It really is one world, and it always has been one world. Envi-
ronmental science, technology, and travel have made us more
aware of our interconnectedness, but few of us, knowingly or not,
go through our lives without interacting or being affected by per-
sons, events, or things that are outside our local area of residence.
It may perhaps be most obvious in the context of the environment
and biology and our own susceptibility to germs, bacteria, and dis-
ease, but events that occur in one part of the world have and have
always had an effect on other parts of the world. Thus, while differ-
ences in cultures, values, religion, language, attitudes, politics and
economies remain stark, we will continue to have to deal with each
other.
Globalization exposes the tensions inherent in concepts of citi-
zenship, particularly for states that treat citizenship as material to
the issue of human rights. Basic human rights, like freedom from
166 SINGER, supra note 33.
167 Id. at ix.
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gender discrimination, should not depend on citizenship status.168
One lesson we have learned from the American experience,
from the German experience, from the formation of the European
Union, is that for a society or civilization to thrive, each individual
member residing in the community has to be guaranteed basic
human rights.169 Whether these rights are inherent in humanity or
whether they are derived from some other source is immaterial to
the idea that all individuals are entitled to some set of rights. In the
context of the United States, the fifty states may provide different
legal norms, benefits, and protections to their residents, but the
plain language of the Constitution guarantees to all persons in the
country the protection of their basic human rights.
Globalization poses a challenge for legal adherence to and en-
forcement of gender equality norms. Feminist writers and com-
mentators have warned that gender is a problem in the context of
globalization, but their admonishment remains unincorporated
into mainstream diplomatic and political structures.170
That approach is dangerous. Gender stereotypes still play too
predominant a role in Western societies for silence on the issue of
gender equality in a global context. Adherence to norms of gender
equality must be as important a part of the discussion on globaliza-
tion as other human rights, the environment, trade, labor, the
economy, and public health.
Presently, in the United States, constitutional limits generally
prohibit governmental discrimination on the basis of sex. Nguyen’s
approach is likely to be limited to the immigration and naturaliza-
tion context, in which the Court traditionally has adopted a highly
168 See infra Nguyen discussion; Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
169 See, e.g., Christian Joppke, The Evolution of Alien Rights in the United States, Ger-
many, and the European Union, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY, supra note 5, at 36-62.
170 See Vicki C. Jackson, Feminist Justice, At Home and Abroad: Gender and Transnational
Legal Discourse, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 377 (2002); Volpp, Feminism Versus Multicul-
turalism, supra note 20; Volpp, Talking, supra note 20; Barbara Stark, Women and Global-
ization: The Failure and Postmodern Possibilities of International Law, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 503 (2000); Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of Transna-
tional Litigation for Feminists Concerned About Domestic Violence Here and Abroad, 11 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749 (2003). See generally Joan Fitzpatrick & William McKay
Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of International Law on the Immigration Policy of
the United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 589 (1985); Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty,
and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999); Natsu
Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power over the “Other:” Indians, Immigrations, Colonial Sub-
jects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 427 (2002); Kevin R. Johnson, The Moral High Ground? The Relevance of Interna-
tional Law to Remedying Racial Discrimination in the U.S. Immigration Laws, in MORAL
IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 285 (Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol ed.,
2002).
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deferential posture to Congressional and executive exercises of
powers.171 Notwithstanding, it is a symbol of perhaps more mean-
ingful protections against discrimination on the basis of sex are se-
cured by federal statutes.172 States and municipalities also extend
some protection to persons who have been injured by gender
bias.173 The federal enforcement scheme, while imperfect, is
stronger than perhaps in any other nation. As with labor, environ-
mental, and health concerns, it behooves our legal and govern-
mental institutions to partake in the international dialogue to
secure global acceptance and enforcement of gender equality
norms.
A recent period of residency in Greece on a Fulbright grant,
allowed me to explore normative and enforcement commitment to
gender equality in a different setting. Greece is a predominantly
homogeneous society with a rich historical and cultural tradition
that in modern times merges elements of Western and Middle
Eastern civilizations.174 Like many of its European counterparts,
Greece is a small country. Its total population of almost eleven mil-
lion is spread out over mountainous, dry, rocky, and arid territory
consisting, in part, of 1,400 islands.175
American scholars think of Greece in the context of ancient
Greece and what ancient Greek philosophers contributed to the
modern world: the development of democracy, a conception of
equality,176 and, more recently, a conception of sex and gender
171 See, e.g., Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1
(2002).
172 See, e.g., Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a) (2000); Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000); Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972,
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
173 See, e.g., CAL. [CIV.] CODE § 52.4 (West 2002) (creating a cause of action for
victims of gender violence); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/10 (2004) (providing a cause of
action for persons who have been subjected to gender violence); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.2231 (West 2003) (prohibiting assaults motivated by gender bias); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-21 (West 2003); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (2003) (prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of gender); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-904 (2000)
(providing a cause of action for victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence against
perpetrators); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-1-475 (Law Co-op. 2003) (requiring continuing
education for teachers and appropriate staff regarding domestic and family violence).
174 See generally RICHARD CLOGG, A CONCISE HISTORY OF GREECE (CAMBRIDGE 1992);
C. M. WOODHOUSE, A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN GREECE (1991).
175 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background
Note: Greece (Nov. 2004) at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3395.htm (on file with
the New York City Law Review).
176 Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, Historical Development, in INTRODUCTION TO GREEK
LAW 2-4 (2d ed. by Konstantinos D. Kerameus & Phaedon J. Kozyris). Aristotle and
ancient Greece appear frequently in modern discussions of equality theory. See, e.g.,
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that accommodates human potential for differences in sexual ori-
entation.177  Greece warrants closer scrutiny, however, in its mod-
ern state, which offers a unique opportunity for examination of a
culture or society that has accommodated a blending of Western
and Eastern values. Its relative political and economic stability facil-
itate that scrutiny and enable enhanced understanding of the cul-
tural similarities and divergences between Western and Middle
Eastern societies. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, Greece
spent four hundred years under Ottoman rule.178 This Turkish
heritage is evident in modern Greek music, food, customs and mo-
res, and influences, in part, attitudes toward gender and norms of
gender equality. Many of the issues facing Middle Eastern, Muslim,
and African societies have been dealt with or are being dealt with
by Greek society, including an issue of particular importance to
gender, that of separation of church and state.179 Like many other
societies, the role of the church in Greece is significant; the Greek
Orthodox Church is part of the Greek state180 and plays an active
role in state policy and the development of norms.
Greece’s current constitution was adopted on June 11,
1975.181 The constitution eliminated facial discrimination on the
basis of sex by formally adopting a requirement of equality, but
many gender-based distinctions remained until 1982, shortly after
Greece’s admission to the European Union as its tenth member.
Like many countries, Greece has embraced gender equality, but,
for the most part, enforcement of gender equality is lacking. Fur-
thermore, gender equality under the Greek constitution is guaran-
teed only to Greek citizens.182 Equality norms apply to Greek
Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415, 418-19,
443-45 (2003); Sean Pager, Strictness vs. Discretion: The European Court of Justice’s Variable
Vision of Gender Equality, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 553 (2003); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sex-
ual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 527 (1997); Peter Margulies, Inclu-
sive and Exclusive Virtues: Approaches to Identity, Merit and Responsibility in Recent Legal
Thought, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1109 (1997); Linda R. Hirschman, The Book of “A,” 70
TEX. L. REV. 971 (1992); Richard A. Posner, Response: Ms. Aristotle, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1013 (1992); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1182 (1989).
177 See Marilyn Yalom, Symposium, Marriage Law: Obsolete or Cutting Edge?, 10 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 21, 39 (2003); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado
Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REV.
1515 (1994).
178 CLOGG, supra note 174, at 1-46; WOODHOUSE, supra note 174, at 99-157; Yianno-
poulos, supra note 176, at 6-7.
179 Yiannopoulos, supra note 176, at 6-7.
180 CONSTITUTION OF GREECE, art. 3.
181 CONSTITUTION OF GREECE.
182 CONSTITUTION OF GREECE, art. 4.
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citizens under the Greek constitution, but European Union mem-
bership may ensure that European Union citizens will be accorded
similar treatment under Greek law. Non-European Union citizens,
however, and this includes the bulk of immigrants currently resid-
ing in Greece, do not enjoy a constitutional entitlement to free-
dom from state mandated or sponsored gender bias.
Further, Greek law does not reflect a well developed statutory
framework of enforcement. For example, although gender employ-
ment discrimination is prohibited, enforcement of that norm is left
primarily to employers; certain jobs are still reserved for men and
there is no specific statutory provision prohibiting sexual harass-
ment in the workplace.183 Inadequate resources and an insufficient
commitment to gender equality norms continue to undermine ef-
forts to eliminate harassment, gender-motivated violence, employ-
ment discrimination and sexual-trafficking.184 Full integration of
women into the economy, the work force and the government is a
goal not yet accomplished.185 Greek laws on gender discrimination
changed, however, primarily as a result of Greece’s membership in
the European Union.186 Moreover, European Union pressure to
enhance enforcement of norms prohibiting gender bias in Greece
and throughout the European Union continues. Thus, the Euro-
pean Union is an example of regional norms affecting or influenc-
ing national norms.187 The dialogue between European Union
member states and the European Court of Justice serves to develop
and foster a grander and more meaningful international legal
dialogue.
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions and writings reflect an acknowl-
edgment and exploration of this international legal dialogue.188 In
a number of opinions, Justice Ginsburg uses international conven-
tions to explain the reasons why American constitutional norms
should be influenced by international norms. In a sense, interna-
tional customary law, conventions, and judicial opinions may play a
parallel role in constitutional adjudication to that of state laws and
183 See Mary Ellen Tsekos, The New European Union Directive on Sexual Harassment and
its Implications to Greece, 10 Hum. Rts. Br. 31 (2003); THEODORE KONIARIS, LABOUR LAW
IN HELLAS 124-25, 127, 445 (2002).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 KONIARIS, supra note at 184, at 53, 79-81, 86.
187 See Yiannopoulos, supra note 176, at 10.
188 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 296-304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-45 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); American Ins. Ass’n
v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428-441 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Ginsburg, Sex
Equality and the Constitution, supra note 3.
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state practices. Generally, when the Court considers a human
rights issue, it will look at state law and practices to determine
whether adherence to precedent make sense or whether a break
from precedent is necessary.189 State norms and state court opin-
ions are not necessarily determinative, but the Court, nonetheless,
considers them as evidence of consensus or prevailing trends, and
considers them as evidence of the need for a national uniform
norm.
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence establishes that interpreta-
tion of American constitutional norms may be appropriately influ-
enced by international conventions and international norms when
those norms further and are consistent with American constitu-
tional values and doctrines. Continued reference to international
conventions and norms enhances and strengthens international
and global norms. Comprehensive discussion of international con-
ventions and norms in the development of American constitutional
law engages the international legal, legislative, and judicial com-
munity, facilitating the further development of international
norms and law enforcement. This dialogue also facilitates and is
evidence of a continued membership and participation in the
global community. Supreme Court cases from this last term lend
themselves to this approach, and I will briefly discuss three of them
as examples of how awareness of international norms or conven-
tions may be of use in American constitutional law and serve to
contribute, at the same time, to the development of a global order.
The cases deal with human rights issues, namely, affirmative ac-
tion190 and detention of noncitizens.191 The Court’s resolution of
these issues for the most part was accomplished with no reference
or consideration, in the majority opinion, of the practices of other
nations, or of international conventions or norms. The cases would
have benefited from formal consideration of international norms,
even where those norms are inconsistent, contrary to, or depart
from American norms.
In Gratz v. Bollinger,192 the Supreme Court held that a race-
conscious undergraduate admissions plan violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to the compelling interest of admit-
ting a diverse student body.193  In Grutter v. Bollinger, a different
189 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707, 710-16 (1997).
190 Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
191 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
192 Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
193 Id. at 275.
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majority upheld the state law school’s race-conscious admissions
policy.194 The Court held that a law school has a compelling inter-
est in attaining a diverse student body and that law schools are enti-
tled to deference in exercising their judgment that “such diversity
is essential in its educational mission.”195 Neither of the majority
opinions reference international human rights law; nor do they
make any reference to the experience or practices of other coun-
tries. In fact, the majority opinions deal with issues of affirmative
action and race as if they are American issues—as if racism and
equality are problems peculiarly and exclusively American. The
majority opinion in Grutter notes the “increasingly global market-
place” and the impact on national security of failing to provide ex-
posure to “widely diverse people, cultures and ideas, and
viewpoints,”196 but shies away from taking note of global trends and
developments on the issue of diversity itself. Justice Ginsburg’s con-
currence in Grutter by contrast, opens with an acknowledgment of
the global nature of the issue and the formal global response to
that issue.197
The Court’s observation that race-conscious programs “must
have a logical end point” . . . accords with the international un-
derstanding of the office of affirmative action. The International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, ratified by the United States in 1994, . . . endorses “spe-
cial and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development
and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging
to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and
equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental free-
doms.”. . . But such measures, the Convention instructs, “shall in
no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or
separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for
which they were taken have been achieved.”198
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions make clear that the problems
caused by racial discrimination and government responsibility for
affirmatively responding to its continuing effects is recognized by
the global community as a human rights issue. Recognition of in-
ternational norms and consensus on the issue of remedying or af-
firmatively responding to the vestiges of past widespread
subjugation of races (or persons because of their sex) encourages
194 Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
195 Id. at 328.
196 Id. at 330.
197 Id. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 at 298-305
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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more careful and serious consideration of legally required govern-
mental abdication of that responsibility.
The last case I wish to discuss briefly, returns, albeit indirectly,
to one of the themes I explored earlier in this article: the concept
of citizenship. In Demore v. Kim,199 a majority of the Supreme Court
found that mandatory detention of permanent legal residents dur-
ing removal proceedings, without an individualized showing that
the alien posed a flight risk or a danger to the community, did not
violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.200
The Court, in part, based its decision on Congress’s “broad power
over naturalization and immigration,” which permits Congress to
regulate aliens in a manner “that would be unacceptable if applied
to citizens.”201 In turn, the Court reasoned that Congress’s power
to distinguish between citizens and noncitizens rested on the pre-
mise that “any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwo-
ven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republi-
can form of government.”202
The majority acknowledges that distinctions between citizens
and noncitizens are based in part on the relationship between the
United States and other nation-states, including regional arrange-
ments like the European Union. However, the opinion does not
explore or in any way consider international legal norms or norms
of other nation-states, on the issue of treatment, and specifically,
detention of noncitizens. Traditionally, judicial review is most def-
erential to the executive and legislative branches in the area of for-
eign affairs. The singular exception, of course, has been in the area
of human rights, and detention, like gender discrimination, is a
human rights issue. This has not prevented the modern Court
from drawing stark lines between what the government will be con-
stitutionally permitted to do to citizens and noncitizens. Interna-
tional norms on detention of noncitizens may, in fact, be much less
protective of noncitizens than the norms developed in the United
States in the latter half of the twentieth century,203 but, as in the
case of gender discrimination, formal acknowledgement of inter-
national practices will clarify the extent to which international
practices may influence constitutional adjudication today.
199 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
200 Id.
201 Id. (citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
202 Id.
203 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 35 (1982).
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Like gender bias, international practice regarding detention
or seizures of persons, too frequently departs from basic human
rights norms. Because the United States has emerged as a country
with one of the strongest prohibitions against unlawful use of state
seizure or detention of persons, it is critical for our Supreme Court
to take note of our international leadership when considering
weakening or departing from the strong constitutional protections
that have been developed over many decades against overzealous
and abusive government practices. Formal consideration of inter-
national norms on detention also forces us to confront the ease
with which other nations have resorted to unlawful seizures and
frequent violations of the most basic human rights in the context
of detention. Formally acknowledging that ease and frequency
could be useful to justify our own departures from the strong legal
disapprobation of unlawful seizures and detentions. That depar-
ture, however, would be at odds with established American legal
precedents. Formally acknowledging international practices will
clarify the extent to which these international practices are already
playing a role, albeit a silent one, in constitutional adjudication to-
day. Justice Ginsburg’s articulation of what the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires from the federal
government in the context of gender is clear and unambiguous.
Her opinions reflect a consciousness of the importance of recog-
nizing international legal norms and practices in formulating our
own, particularly in the context of cases posing basic human rights
issues. If we are, in fact, the most powerful culture in the world
today, it would behoove the Court to acknowledge our position as a
world leader in formulating basic human rights norms on citizen-
ship and gender. Basic human rights should not depend on citizen-
ship; neither here, in the United States, nor anywhere else. The
United States cannot, and should not, dictate law to other coun-
tries, but it can, and should, work toward the development of a
global order that universally recognizes and protects the basic
human rights of all persons. Justice Ginsburg’s opinions work to-
ward this goal; it is to be hoped that the Court as a whole will follow
her lead.
